Nov 25, The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of In this outstanding introduction Brie Gertler assesses the leading. Self-Knowledge has 14 ratings and 3 reviews. Sara said: A good intro to a still very new subject but the author was really very biased in her analysis of. Feb 7, In philosophy, “self-knowledge” standardly refers to knowledge of one’s . in direct introspective apprehension of a sensation (Gertler ;.
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Wilson now acknowledges this limitation. How do you know your own thoughts and feelings? The idea that our rationality guarantees that we grasp, or are capable of grasping, our own mental states is plausible only on a fairly demanding conception of what it is to be rational.
Others argue that while self-attributions may constitute self-knowledge, they are not epistemically superior to other kinds of beliefs. MJCBorsuk added it Mar 21, Academic Tools How to cite this entry. Justus Hartnack – – Melbourne [Etc.
The xelf of self-knowledge outlined thus far share a common feature: It applies only to attitudes that express our rational agency, and hence only to attitudes that are sensitive to reasons. A mind-body dualist, she is presently a teaching associate professor at the University of Virginia.
Boghossian concludes that we face a trilemma regarding self-knowledge. The most difficult hurdle for acquaintance accounts is to explain how this conceptualization occurs. But our social-linguistic practice of treating others as authorities on their own states cries out for explanation: Moran accepts that the link between evidence bearing on whether pand the belief that pshould be accessible to ordinary thinkers.
The problem of self-knowledge is one of the most fascinating in all of philosophy and has crucial significance for the philosophy of mind and epistemology. So our responsibility to satisfy rational norms epistemically entitles us to those judgments about our attitudes that are crucial for satisfying those norms. Categories Critical Thinking in Epistemology. Another worry about acquaintance accounts stems from the observation that we sometimes err about our experiences.
Kathleen marked it as to-read Dec 20, A Study sefl Self-KnowledgeOxford: In noticing these we are preparing ourselves to do something new, namely to describe the frames of mind which these utterances disclose. The constitutivist may regard such phenomena as involving failures of rationality and, therefore, as falling outside the scope of the constitutivist thesis.
Strictly speaking, then, this position is not concerned with self- knowledge. Beginning with an outline of the distinction between self-knowledge and self-awareness and providing essential historical background to the problem, Gertler addresses specific theories of self-knowledge such as the acquaintance theory, the inner knowledve theory, and the rationalist theory, as well as leading accounts of self-awareness.
Kristopher marked it as to-read May 02, Want to Bri saving…. The differences between these are subtle.
Self-Knowledge by Brie Gertler
A common objection to even limited infallibility claims is the idea, often attributed to Wittgenstein, that where one cannot be wrong, one cannot be right either. Like Burge and Moran, Bilgrami regards self-knowledge as intimately tied to the phenomenon of rational agency. Carruthers argues that because judgments, decisions, and other attitudes are defined by their causal roles, these cannot be known purely on the basis of an experience of inner speech or other sensory data. First-person authority stems from the fact that it is only the subject herself who can directly express her states through an avowal.
Books by Brie Gertler. On such accounts, and in contrast to acquaintance accounts, the connection between the introspected state the input and the introspective state the output is causal and contingent. Other objections to the more general transparency approach to desires and intentions are discussed in 3.
The Brei of Self-Knowledge. Among Gertler’s other fields of study are epistemology and the philosophy of language. He argues that a mental state, and a self-attribution of inowledge state, can share a single basis.
Oxford University Press, Wright, C. This conclusion is borne out by his collaboration with a psychologist Hurlburt and Schwitzgebel Goodreads helps you keep track of books you want to read. An obvious worry concerns mundane cases of ignorance or self-deception. In effect, this objection denies that introspective attention to an instance of a phenomenal quality can provide for an understanding of that quality adequate for genuine beie knowledge. My library Help Advanced Book Search.
This special warrant accrues to subjects only when issuing present-tense self-ascriptions of occurrent mental states, and only when they do so in the avowing mode—that is, only when they exercise their first-person privilege.
Rodolfo added it May 08,